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Abstract
Questionable research practices like HARKing or p-hacking have generated
considerable recent interest throughout and beyond the scientific community.
We subsume such practices involving secret data snooping that influences sub-
sequent statistical inference under the term MESSing (manipulating evidence
subject to snooping) and discuss, illustrate and quantify the possibly dramatic
effects of several forms of MESSing using an empirical and a simple theoret-
ical example. The empirical example uses numbers from the most popular
German lottery, which seem to suggest that 13 is an unlucky number.
Keywords: research transparency; meta-research; p-hacking; HARKing; statistical
significance
1 Introduction
The most popular lottery in Germany is “Lotto 6 out of 49”. The 6 winning numbers
of one game are determined by drawing 6 balls without replacement from a pool of
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Figure 1: Frequency distribution of N = 4337 games, i.e. from n = 6 · N = 26022
numbers (German Lotto 6 out of 49); broken line: expected frequency under equal
probability, solid line: frequency of number 13
49 balls identified by means of the first 49 natural numbers. The first game took
place on October 9, 1955, and the first ball ever drawn carried the number 13.Until
November 29, 2019, a total of 4337 games had been played with n = 6 ·4337 = 26022
balls being drawn. Figure 1 displays the absolute frequencies for each number 1
through 49.1 What does strike you at first glance? The number 13 stands out with
the least favourable odds. This may come as no surprise to people that consider
13 to be an “unlucky number”. As a result of fear of the number 13 (clinically:
triskaidekaphobia) there is no row 13 in many planes or no floor 13 in many tall
buildings and many people avoid Friday the 13th for marriage. And indeed, the
number 13 was drawn only 471 times in the German lottery, while (roughly) 531 cases
would have to be expected under equal probability of all 49 numbers given 26022
draws (broken line in Figure 1). If a PhD student presents such descriptive evidence
to her or his supervisor, the supervisor might ask: Is the deviation significant? At
which level? And how can we test properly?
Let p13 be the probability of getting 13 when drawing a Lotto number. We wish to
test p13 = 1/49 against the one-sided alternative:
H0 : p13 =
1
49
vs. H1 : p13 <
1
49
.
The test statistic accounting for the implied dependence of the German lottery due
to drawing without replacement is Z
(6)
13 from equation (3) resulting in Z
(6)
13 = −2.7822
with the highly significant p-value of 0.270% relying on the normal approximation.
1The data were downloaded from https://www.lotto.de/lotto-6aus49/statistik/ziehungshaeu-
figkeit on November 29, 2019.
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Is the German lottery flawed? Is 13 truely an unlucky number? What is going
wrong?
The answer to the last question is what we call MESSing. We propose the generic
term MESSing (Manipulating Evidence Subject to Snooping) to subsume practices
which involve conducting statistical inference after data analysis of some form has
already been carried out and influenced the researchers’ decisions, but is not ac-
knowledged.
In recent years a number of such questionable research practices related to statistical
inference situated somewhere in the grey zone between exploratory data analysis and
fraud have attracted the attention of the academic literature in many fields such
as medicine, psychology or economics (see e.g. Ioannidis (2005), Simmons et al.
(2011) and Brodeur et al. (2016)). Popular examples are HARKing (Hypothesizing
After the Results are Known) (see Kerr (1998)) or p-hacking (see Simmons et al.
(2011)). Often these practices seem innocent, are not used with bad intentions and
are deeply rooted in the research culture. But they invalidate inference and may
consequently lead to wrong results and distorted literatures. Further, due to the
lack of transparency related to these practices their extent and exact consequences
are very hard to assess. Even though their detrimental effects like e.g. impeding the
replicability of research, slowing down scientific progress or damaging the credibility
of science have been discussed and some steps have been taken to curb them in
recent years (see e.g. Wasserstein et al. (2019) or Christensen et al. (2019)), they
still seem to be in widespread use. Convincing researchers to refrain from these
practices is, alongside other measures, certainly crucial. This starts with a clear
understanding of the issue and the problems arising from it throughout the scientific
community. Our paper aims to contribute to that. We give an overarching definition
subsuming all these practices under the term MESSing and discuss and illustrate
several forms of MESSing using the example of the German lottery numbers and
a simple theoretical example. While some forms of MESSing like HARKing or p-
hacking are well documented, we also point out other forms that have hardly or not
at all been recognized. These include practices trying to weaken evidence instead of
strengthening it and driving evidence to the extreme instead of just jumping over
significance thresholds.
The next section explains why the “puzzle” of the overly significant unlucky number
13 arises and how it can be solved. Then several forms of MESSing are illustrated
using the example of the lottery numbers. Section 3 connects this discussion to
previous literature and goes into some details on MESSing. Section 4 contains
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a simple theoretical example that illustrates and allows to quantify the effects of
MESSing in different directions. Some conclusions are offered in the final section.
2 Testing for Unlucky 13
The general case of Lotto K out of V consists of K balls drawn without replacement
in one game from an urn of V balls. In the German lottery, we have V = 49 and
K = 6, but we stick with a general K for reasons that will become obvious below.
Let L1, · · · , LK , LK+1, · · · , L2·K , L2·K+1, · · · , LN ·K be the consecutive numbers drawn
in N games. To execute a test of uniformity we are interested in the counts of the
49 numbers from the sample of size n = N ·K. Let the counts of these numbers be
denoted by Sm,m = 1, 2, ..., 49, and consider the Bernoulli random variables
Xm,i =
1 if Li = m0 if Li 6= m , i = 1 . . . , N ·K = n,
which indicate if the ith ball drawn shows the number m or not. These are the
ingredients to determine the total counts
Sm =
n∑
i=1
Xm,i.
We are interested in testing the null hypothesis
H0 : P (Xm,i = 1) =
1
49
for one specific m ∈ {1, 2, ..., 49}.
Under H0 it holds that Xm,i ∼ Be
(
1
49
)
and E[Sm] =
n
49
. However, due to the
dependence between the Bernoulli random variables Xm,i within one game caused by
drawing without replacement, Sm does not follow a binomal distribution Bi
(
n, 1
49
)
.
Consequently, the classical binomial test constructed under the i.i.d. assumption,
Ziidm :=
Sm − n49
σiid
with σ2iid :=
n(49− 1)
492
, (1)
does not follow a standard normal law asymptotically. However, as we show in the
appendix, only the variance decreases due to the negative dependence between the
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Xm,i,
σ2(K) :=
49−K
49− 1 σ
2
iid, (2)
and has to be adjusted to retain limiting standard normality under H0:
Z(K)m :=
Sm − n49
σ(K)
=
√
49− 1
49−KZ
iid
m
d−→ Z, (3)
where Z follows a standard normal distribution, Z ∼ N (0, 1), and “ d−→” denotes
convergence in distribution as the sample size n diverges.
As mentioned in the introduction, when computing this test statistic for m = 13, we
get Z
(6)
13 = −2.7822 with the highly significant p-value of 0.00270. What causes this
test result is of course MESSing. This nonsensical significance arises because we first
looked at the data in Figure 1, observed the remarkable deviation of S13 = 471 from
26022
49
= 531.06, and then tested for this specific hypothesis. A real MESSy would
tell a more or less convincing story here or present some theory that lead him or her
to come up with this hypothesis, which would in our case of the unlucky number 13
be quite comical. In other cases, this is usually not that obvious and MESSing is
hard to detect.
Such a MESS had been blamed already by Wallis (1942, p. 229): “An investigator
who after inspecting the data decides what to test or how to make the test can, by
virtue of the fact that any sample has unique characteristics, disprove any hypoth-
esis.” This form of MESSing, where the same data is used to postulate and to test
the hypothesis, has later been called HARKing, which will be discussed in detail in
the next section.
We are able to quantify the effect of this MESS in our example if we are willing
to assume that the Lotto numbers follow a uniform distribution: What we did
amounts to testing with minm=1,...,49 Sm, and not surprisingly, the minimum deviates
significantly from the overall mean. The number 13 was picked for testing because
m = 13 leads to the strongest left-sided violation of the null in favour of pm < 1/49.
Let minS := minm=1,...,49 Sm and
Z
(6)
min :=
minS − n
49
σ(6)
.
We denote the limit in distribution of Z
(6)
min for n → ∞ as Z(6)min. The density of
Z(6)min is depicted in Figure 2 alongside a standard normal density, i.e. the density
5
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Figure 2: Density of Z(6)min (obtained by simulations) compared to a standard normal
density
of the asymptotic distribution of Z
(6)
m under the null.2 Due to MESSing the distri-
bution dramatically changes its shape, leading to very small p-values. From Z(6)min
we can also calculate the size distortions: The rejection probabilities under the null
hypothesis, i.e. the type I errors, for the three significance levels 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1
are (with zα denoting the α-quantile of Z ∼ N (0, 1)):
P (Z(6)min ≤ z0.01) = 0.3879, P (Z(6)min ≤ z0.05) = 0.9376 and P (Z(6)min ≤ z0.1) = 0.9984.
In our empirical example with Z
(6)
13 = −2.7822 the p-value corrected for MESSing is
P (Z(6)min ≤ −2.7822) = 0.1203. However, in practice, such a correction for MESSing
is usually infeasible as there are many forms of MESSing and it is usually unknown
which forms have been used if any.
There may be statistical methods that are more robust to certain forms of MESSing.
In our case, such a method is available: A proper way to test the null hypothesis of
uniformity has to take into account each number m ∈ {1, . . . , 49}, which amounts
to the goodness-of-fit test by Pearson (1900) for the joint hypothesis:
H0 : P (X1,i = 1) = P (X2,i = 1) = ... = P (X49,i = 1) =
1
49
. (4)
2We approximated the distribution of Z(6)min under uniformity of Lotto numbers by simulations,
i.e. we simulated 10000 times a sample of 6 ·10000 Lotto numbers and then looked at the empirical
distribution of the test statistics. The density, which is drawn in the picture, is a kernel density
estimate. Of course, we could also have simulated for our sample size N = 4337, but there are
virtually no differences as we are very close to the asymptotic distribution no matter if N = 4337
or 10000.
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sample type n statistic p-value
I 6/49 26022 χ2(6) = 61.51 9.11%
II 6/49 + add. num. 29637 χ2(7) = 60.58 10.51%
III add. num. only 3615 χ2iid = 48.64 44.70%
Table 1: Sample I: numbers “6 out of 49” without replacement from 4337 games;
sample II: sample I plus an additional number drawn without replacement in 83.35%
of all games; sample III: independently drawn additional number only
Again the dependence in the Xm,i due to drawing without replacement invalidates
the classical approach, i.e. the test statistic
χ2iid :=
49∑
m=1
(Sm − n49)2
n
49
(5)
does not converge in distribution to a χ2(48) random variable. Again, only a scaling
factor (known from equation (2)) is required to recover the limiting chi-squared
distribution under the null:
χ2(K) :=
49− 1
49−K χ
2
iid
d→ χ2(48). (6)
This limit arises as a special case of more general results by Joe (1993, p. 183) for
Pearson’s tests for uniformity of k-tuples, k ∈ {1, 2, ..., K} in the lottery K out of
V ; see also Genest et al. (2002) or the earlier closely related results from the survey
sampling literature by Rao and Scott (1981). The data behind Figure 1 provide
χ2iid = 55.10 and χ
2
(6) = 61.51, see Table 1. The p-value of χ
2
(6) when comparing
with the χ2(48) distribution is 9.11%. The p-value is much higher now and the
German lottery data do not violate the uniform distribution hypothesis (4) at a 9%
significance level.
The firm operating the lottery may not be happy with a p-value of 9.11%, which is
below the 10% hurdle that many researchers maintain for a semblance of significance.
To leave no doubt about the uniform distribution, the Lotto operator might wish
to produce weaker evidence, that is a larger p-value. This can easily be achieved
by modifying the sample. Notwithstanding the name “6 out of 49”, in 3615 out
of 4337 games an additional number was drawn, which changed the price money,3
amounting in fact to 7 numbers drawn from 49 without replacement. In Figure 3
we display the frequency distribution of this modified sample, which we call sample
3On June 17, 1956, the drawing of the 7th additional number was introduced, and abolished on
May 4, 2013.
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Figure 3: Frequency distribution for N = 4337 games, where 3615 out of 4337 games
included a 7th additional number, leading to n = 29637 number
II in contrast to the original sample, which we call sample I, see Table 1 for an
overview. Employing equation (6) again, we calculate χ2(6) = 59.17 and χ
2
(7) = 60.58
with p-values 0.1295 and 0.1051, respectively. Note that neither χ2(6) nor χ
2
(7) are
fully appropriate for the data behind Figure 3, where K was equal to 7 only in about
83% of the games and K was 6 else. The correct p-value will hence be between 10.5%
and 12.9%, but above 10% in any case, jumping over the significance threshold and
reducing the evidence against a violation of uniformity.
If the rationale is really to minimize the evidence against uniformity, i.e. to be as
far away from significance as possible in terms of the p-value, the lottery firm may
come up with some arguments to restrict the attention to the sample of additional
numbers only, which we call sample III. This might be seemingly justified by the
fact that this sample of size n = 3615 is independent such that the conventional
χ2iid from (5) may be used for testing. With the data behind Figure 4 this yields
χ2iid = 48.64 with a p-value of 44.7% being beyond any reasonable significance level.
The strong significance of Z
(6)
13 computed from sample I (and the dramatic change in
the distribution of the tests statistic), the much weaker significance of χ2(6) and χ
2
(7)
from sample I and sample II, respectively, and the insignificance of χ2iid from sample
III illustrate the effects of MESSing and how MESSies may proceed in practice.
One way occurring here is looking at the sample and manipulating the hypothesis
or choice of test, which happens with Z
(6)
13 ; another way consists of extending (or
reducing) the sample with seemingly reasonable arguments until p-values become
significant or insignificant, depending on the goals of the researcher, which happens
when moving from sample I to sample II. When moving to sample III or also when
picking m = 13 for Z
(6)
m , the goal is not merely to jump over some (in)significance
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Figure 4: Frequency distribution of the additional numbers from 3615 games
threshold, but to drive evidence in terms of p-values to the extremes, i.e. in the one
case minimizing and in the other maximizing evidence. The next section provides a
broader discussion of several forms of MESSing and connects it to different strands
of the literature.
3 Manipulating Evidence Subject to Snooping
By coining the term we want to stress that it is crucial to distinguish MESSing from
exploratory data analysis and data mining on the one hand and outright fraud on
the other hand. The term “data mining” has undergone a considerable change in
meaning. Lovell (1983) used it to describe the process of “experimentation” until
t-statistics turn significant, sometimes called data grubbing or dredging or fishing
to defame the applied practice of others, see also White (2000, p. 1098): “Although
data mining has recently acquired positive connotations as a means of extracting
valuable relationships from masses of data, the negative connotations arising from
the ease with which naive practitioners may mistake the spurious for the substan-
tive are more familiar to econometricians and statisticians.” However, nowadays,
data mining receives a lot of attention as a smart toolkit for computational data
analysis intersecting with machine learning and engineering techniques like artificial
intelligence in order to unveil hidden association or patterns in big data sets, see
e.g. Hastie et al. (2009) for an appreciation. Thus, the term data mining is to-
day often interpreted as a form of exploratory data analysis for big data (see Hand
(1998)). Exploratory data analysis is crucial for virtually any statistical analysis
and in other applications the data set is often not large enough to split the sample
for exploratory analysis and inference, thus data snooping is “endemic” not only
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in time series analysis (see White (2000)). MESSing is the dark side of the per-
fectly sensible and necessary practices of exploratory data analysis, data mining or
snooping; it describes when they may become harmful, namely when they are not
acknowledged. On the other hand, even though not acknowledging data snooping
is clearly a manipulation, it should be distinguished from outright fraud like e.g.
fabrication of data. Often the MESSies will not have bad intentions, but e.g. sim-
ply strive to find evidence in favour of a theory they believe in or follow standard
practices in their field. It seems not to be useful to incriminate MESSies, but to
convince them to refrain from MESSing.
We now discuss some forms of MESSing and related issues in detail: One way to
MESS is HARKing (Hypothesizing After the Results are Known) defined by Kerr
(1998, p. 197) as “[...] presenting post hoc hypotheses in a research report as
if they were, in fact, a priori hypotheses”. Such a behaviour is also often called
the Texas sharpshooter fallacy, where the shooter paints the target after firing a
shot. Generally, statistical tests are invalidated when one postulates hypotheses
or test statistics subject to data snooping and uses the same data to test them,
since “agreement between a sample and a hypothesis based on that sample is purely
tautological and proves nothing but accuracy in reading and restating the data of the
sample.”, see Wallis (1942, p. 229). The traditional approach of statistical testing
had been designed for what Hand (1998, p. 112) called primary data analysis: “[...]
the data are collected with a particular question or set of questions in mind”. This
is the reason why subfields like sampling theory and experimental or survey design
are central to statistical theory and practice. Hand (1998) distinguished secondary
data analysis defined as “[...] the process of secondary analysis of large databases
aimed at finding unsuspected relationships which are of interest or value to the
database owners”. Kerr (1998) and Rubin (2017) demonstrated that data mining,
or secondary data analysis, invalidates hypothesis testing: A hypothesis that has
been postulated only after explorative data inspection must not be tested with
the same data. This is why Hollenbeck and Wright (2017) distinguished between
THARKing (transparently HARKing) and SHARKing (secretly HARKing). They
classified SHARKing as an unethical practice. Clearly, not all researchers share
this view, and SHARKing may be a widespread “questionable research practice”
as investigated by John et al. (2012) in an anonymous survey of more than 2.000
academic psychologists. John et al. (2012, Table 1) observed that 35% affirmed of
“reporting an unexpected finding as having been predicted from the start”, which
is in the spirit of SHARKing of course.
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A further popular form of MESSing is what has been called p-hacking recently, see
Simonsohn et al. (2014, p. 534): dredging the data until the p-value is small enough
to reject; see also Simmons et al. (2011). That way one may produce “spectacular
results” and catch attention of a wider public. But also in the smaller scientific
community, there are strong incentives to produce “false positive” results, due to
the so-called publication bias. Sterling (1959, p. 30) already stated that: “There is
some evidence that in fields where statistical tests of significance are commonly used,
research which yields nonsignificant results is not published. Such research being
unknown to other investigators may be repeated independently until eventually by
chance a significant result occurs - an ‘error of the first kind’ - and is published.”; see
also Sterling et al. (1995). In times where researchers are under increasing pressure
to publish successfully, HARKing and p-hacking may be all the more tempting since
“negative results” (nonrejection of hypotheses) are hard to publish.
Sometimes, however, the opposite may be true as well: A researcher may be happy
not to reject a null hypothesis. Consider specification testing of certain assumptions
behind a model we wish to apply. If e.g. we want to perform a simple analysis
of variance (ANOVA), the underlying assumptions are normality of the data and
variance homogeneity. A conscientious statistician would check these assumptions
before applying the ANOVA F -test, and he or she might be tempted to weaken
evidence against the underlying assumptions to jump over the chosen significance
level. Such a behaviour has been called reverse p-hacking by Chuard et al. (2019).
Reverse p-hacking might also be observed in research influenced by industries, which
are interested in weakening evidence of negative effects of their products on health,
e.g. of cigarette smoking on lung cancer (see e.g. White and Bero (2010)).
There may be several reasons why researchers do not only want to reach p-values just
below (or above) classical significance levels as in the case of (reverse-)p-hacking, but
to really minimize (or maximize) p-values. For example smaller p-values often are
perceived as lending more credibility and importance to results without even looking
at the respective effect sizes (see e.g. Wasserstein and Lazar (2016)) or being far away
from significance levels could lead to being above suspicion of p-hacking. Practices
trying to minimize p-values have been called ambitious p-hacking by Simonsohn
et al. (2015).
Let us now revisit the example of the German lottery from the previous section:
A THARKer looks at Figure 1 first, finds the deviations of e.g. S13 and S6 (S6 =
maxm=1,...,49 Sm) striking and postulates H0: pm = 1/49 for all m in order to see
how strongly the data violate the null of uniformity; but then he or she uses χ2(6) as
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an appropriate test statistic, and there is nothing wrong with this approach, even
though snooping took place. A SHARKer, however, would mean to hide the secret
look at Figure 1, present the pair H0: p13 = 1/49 versus H1: p13 < 1/49 as if it were
generated from the prior theory of unlucky numbers, and then use Z
(6)
13 in order to
produce a highly significant result. At the same time, this SHARKer maximizes ev-
idence against uniformity in order to report the most spectacular violation. Moving
from sample I to sample II, or from χ2(6) to χ
2
(7), is in the spirit of reverse p-hacking,
see Table 1. Restricting the data to sample III, however, is in the spirit of minimiz-
ing evidence against the null hypothesis, see again the maximum p-value in Table
1. Except for THARKing, all these strategies are forms of MESSing.
To avoid the negative effects of SHARKing or p-hacking or of MESSing in general,
Wasserstein and Lazar (2016, p. 132) demanded more transparency from scientific
authors: “Researchers should disclose the number of hypotheses explored during
the study, all data collection decisions, all statistical analyses conducted, and all
p-values computed.” On top of requirements for authors, Simmons et al. (2011, p.
1363) added guidelines for reviewers and recommended not to push the authors to
provide highly significant results. Similarly, Sterling et al. (1995, p. 111) encouraged
journal editors to accept or reject empirical studies irrespective of their outcomes
and to make decision rather in light of the importance of the research question and
the adequacy of the employed methods and data. In 2015, the editors of Basic and
Applied Social Psychology (BASP) went one step further and virtually banned “p-
values, t-values, F -values, statements about ‘significant’ differences or lack thereof,
and so on” from this journal, see the Editorial by Trafimow and Marks (2015, p.
1). Unfortunately, a ban of signifiance rituals opens different routes to questionable
research practices. In particular, Fricker Jr. et al. (2019, p. 374) found when
assessing all papers published in BASP in 2016 “[...] multiple instances of authors
overstating conclusions beyond what the data would support if statistical significance
had been considered.” Other measures against MESSing are e.g. using methods
that are robust to certain forms of it (see e.g. White (2000) or the Pearson test
in our Lotto example) or preregistration of research designs (see e.g. Christensen
et al. (2019)). Using Bayesian methods is no remedy against MESSing (see e.g.
Simonsohn (2014)).
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4 Small Manipulations, Big Effects
We propose a simple theoretical example that illustrates MESSing in both directions,
i.e. strengthening as well as weakening evidence subject to snooping and that makes
clear that one is in a sense the mirror image of the other. We then use it to show
how large the detrimental effects of these practices can be in terms of size and power
distortions even in this simplistic setup.
Consider three researchers interested in assessing Gaussianity of daily stock returns.
The first researcher hopes to find a significant deviation from Gaussianity to in-
crease chances for publication of his article on non-normal return distributions. The
second researcher is funded by the financial industry, which has no interest in higher
capital requirements due to the increased risk implied by e.g. fat tails of the return
distribution, and thus is looking for insignificant results. The third researcher is just
interested in scientific progress. All researchers use the same data set with n daily
stock returns x1, x2, ..., xn.
We assume for simplicity that the returns are independent and consider three com-
mon and closely related tests of the null of Gaussianity based on the skewness of
normal random variables being 0, γ1 = 0, and the kurtosis being 3, γ2 = 3. The
tests essentially assess the deviations of the empirical analogues of these standard-
ized moments, γˆ1 and γˆ2, from 0 and 3, where
γˆk =
1
n
∑n
i=1(xi − x)k+2
dk+2
, k = 1, 2 with d =
√√√√ 1
n
n∑
i=1
(xi − x)2 .
The first two tests use only one of the two standardized moments, the third test, the
Jarque-Bera test, see Jarque and Bera (1980), uses both. The skewness and kurtosis
test, see Shapiro et al. (1968), use the squares,
Γ21 = n
γˆ21
6
and Γ22 = n
(γˆ2 − 3)2
24
,
respectively, as test statistics, which asymptotically follow a χ2(1)-distribution under
the null and the Jarque-Bera test uses the sum of the squares,
JB = Γ21 + Γ
2
2,
which follows a χ2(2)-distribution asymptotically under Gaussianity.
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The third researcher uses the full information, i.e. the JB statistic, to test at level α
and thus rejects the null if JB > χ21−α(2). The first researcher, striving to maximize
evidence, checks first and secretly which sample moment violates the null most
and then picks the skewness or kurtosis test accordingly, i.e. determines Γ2max :=
maxk=1,2(Γ
2
k), and rejects if Γ
2
max > χ
2
1−α(1). The second researcher, striving to
minimize evidence, checks first which sample moment violates the null least and
then picks the test in his favour, i.e. determines Γ2min := mink=1,2(Γ
2
k), and rejects if
Γ2min > χ
2
1−α(1).
The MESSing executed by the first and second researcher distorts the properties of
the tests, which we quantify now. To calculate the sizes we assume for simplicity
that we have a rather large sample such that all the underlying three tests have a
real size virtually equal to the nominal size α. Under Gaussianity, Γ1 and Γ2 are
independent. Let R(k) be the event that test k, k = 1, 2, yields a significant result,
i.e. P(R(k)) = P(Γ2k > χ
2
1−α(1)) = α. It then holds:
P(JB > χ21−α(2)) = α ,
P(Γ2max > χ
2
1−α(1)) = P(R
(1) ∪R(2))
= P(R(1)) + P(R(2))− P(R(1))P(R(2))
= 2α− α2,
P(Γ2min > χ
2
1−α(1)) = P(R
(1) ∩R(2))
= P(R(1))P(R(2)) = α2.
For the nominal size of α = 5%, the actual sizes of Γ2max and Γ
2
min are 9.75%
and 0.25%, respectively. Thus, MESSing through choosing a test in favour of the
researchers’ targets can almost double the size or let it almost disappear, and weak-
ening evidence subject to snooping is as harmful as strengthening.
To illustrate the change in power, we assume that the null is wrong in the direction
of a fat-tailed alternative, namely a t-distribution with 10 degrees of freedom, a
t(10)-distribution. We use a significance level of α = 0.05 and obtain the rejection
probabilities using simulations with sample size n = 103 and 106 replications. The
t(10)-distribution is symmetric and leptokurtic (γ1 = 0 and γ2 = 4). As the devia-
tion from normality is with respect to the fourth moment only, the kurtosis test has
14
test statistic Γ21 Γ
2
2 JB Γ
2
max Γ
2
min
size 0.0495 0.0460 0.0485 0.0910 0.0046
power 0.2782 0.9560 0.9405 0.9594 0.2747
Table 2: Simulated sizes and powers of the normality tests for a level of α = 0.05
and a t(10)-distribution under the alternative
a very high power and the skewness test has a low power,
P(R(2)) = 0.9560 and P(R(1)) = 0.2782,
while the JB-test has a power of
P(JB > χ21−α(2)) = 0.9405.
Consequently, weakening evidence by essentially picking the skewness test is very
effective here,
P(Γ2min > χ
2
1−α(1)) = 0.2747.
Strengthening evidence leads to a slight increase of the already high power of the
JB-test used by the honest researcher,
P(Γ2max > χ
2
1−α(1)) = 0.9594.
The simulated sizes and powers for α = 0.05 are summarized in Table 2.
In our example, we allow for only one researcher degree of freedom, namely the
choice of the test statistic. Still in this simple case, Table 2 demonstrates that
MESSing in both directions may already have drastic consequences. As researchers
usually have many degrees of freedom (see Simmons et al. (2011)), the example hints
at how serious the consequences of MESSing may be.
5 Concluding Remarks
Data mining is a useful and essential tool to cope with the challenges of growing
capacities to store and process massive amounts of data. This is not what our
note is about. We rather wish to stress a potential downside of data snooping in
connection with statistical inference. Our empirical exercise with data from the
German lottery and the theoretical example on testing for normality reinforce how
15
misleading statistical hypothesis testing subsequent to data snooping can be and in
how many different forms MESSes (manipulations of evidence subject to snooping)
may come along.
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Appendix
The problem of the Bernoulli variates Xm,i not being independent and consequently
their sum Sm not being binomially distributed and their standardized sum Z
iid
m not
being asymptotically standard normal can be cured by not considering the single
balls drawn. Instead, define for the jth game the Bernoulli random variables indi-
cating if the number m shows up in this game:
Ym,j =
Kj∑
k=K(j−1)+1
Xm,k, j = 1, . . . , N.
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These variables are independent Bernoulli variates, Ym,j ∼ Be
(
K
49
)
, and by con-
struction they determine the total counts:
Sm =
N∑
j=1
Ym,j.
Therefore, Sm obeys the following binomial distribution: Sm ∼ Bi
(
N, K
49
)
. The
binomial test statistic hence becomes
Z(K)m =
Sm − K·N49
σ(K)
with σ2(K) =
KN(49−K)
492
, (7)
which is asymptotically standard normal under the null hypothesis. Obviously, the
case of drawing only K = 1 ball each game yields Z
(1)
m = Ziidm . By comparing the two
test statistics one observes that only the variance changes as formulated in equation
(2). Drawing with replacement leads to a negative dependence between the Xm,i
in one game, which has a balancing effect that explains the drop in the variance
compared to the i.i.d. case. Thus, the large sample test statistic of the classical
binomial test is conservative if applied to this problem and needs to be scaled up as
is done in equation (3) to retain limiting standard normality.
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